| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6766 |
| DP6766 Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings | |
| Francesco Giavazzi; Michael McMahon | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Several regulatory authorities worldwide have recently imposed forward contract obligations on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we investigate how such contractual obligations affect equilibrium bidding in electricity markets, or in any other auction-based market. For this purpose, we introduce forward contracts in a uniform-price multi-unit auction model with complete information. We find that forward contracts are pro-competitive when allocated to relatively large and efficient firms; however, they might be anti-competitive otherwise. We also show that an increase in contract volume need not always be welfare improving. From a methodological point of view, we aim at contributing to the literature on multi-unit auctions with discrete bids. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Forward contracts Multi-unit auctions Discrete bids market power Electricity Antitrust remedies Simulations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6766 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535604 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Giavazzi,Michael McMahon. DP6766 Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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