| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6781 |
| DP6781 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India | |
| Rachel Glennerster; Abhijit Banerjee; Esther Duflo; Rukmini Banerji; Stuti Khemani | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors? average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors? average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Hirshleifer effect Market data sales Price discovery transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6781 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535629 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rachel Glennerster,Abhijit Banerjee,Esther Duflo,et al. DP6781 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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