G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6781
DP6781 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India
Rachel Glennerster; Abhijit Banerjee; Esther Duflo; Rukmini Banerji; Stuti Khemani
发表日期2008-04-23
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors? average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors? average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Hirshleifer effect Market data sales Price discovery transparency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6781
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535629
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rachel Glennerster,Abhijit Banerjee,Esther Duflo,et al. DP6781 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India. 2008.
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