| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6785 |
| DP6785 Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil | |
| Suzanne Duryea; Eliana La Ferrara; Alberto Chong | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). If the marginal provision cost is constant, the open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide, and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models. If the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution: in fact, quality drops to the minimum level in steady state, implying that quality competition is effectively eliminated. In this case, static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality. Our results can explain the mixed empirical evidence on competition and quality for regulated markets. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Regulated markets Competition Quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6785 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535633 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Suzanne Duryea,Eliana La Ferrara,Alberto Chong. DP6785 Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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