G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6827
DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke?
Willem Buiter
发表日期2008-05-18
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects received lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.
主题Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics
关键词Behavioural biases Cognitive abilities Cooling-off Emotions Internet experiment Negotiations Ultimatum game
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6827
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535656
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Willem Buiter. DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke?. 2008.
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