| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6827 |
| DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke? | |
| Willem Buiter | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects received lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Behavioural biases Cognitive abilities Cooling-off Emotions Internet experiment Negotiations Ultimatum game |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6827 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535656 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Willem Buiter. DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke?. 2008. |
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