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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP6827 |
DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke? | |
Willem Buiter | |
发表日期 | 2008-05-18 |
出版年 | 2008 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects received lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
关键词 | Behavioural biases Cognitive abilities Cooling-off Emotions Internet experiment Negotiations Ultimatum game |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6827 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535656 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Willem Buiter. DP6827 Can Central Banks Go Broke?. 2008. |
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