| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6875 |
| DP6875 Defying the 'Juncker Curse?: Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected? | |
| Alessandro Turrini; Marco Buti; Paul van den Noord; Pietro Biroli | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority?s resource allocation is affected by its relationships with sectoral regulators and their biases. If agencies collaborate (compete), the competition authority spends more effort on the industry with the more (less) consumer-biased sectoral regulator. The competition authority spends budget increases on the industry whose regulator reacts less to more effort. The socially optimal budget corrects for distortions due to regulatory bias, but only downwards. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition authority Regulatory bias Sectoral regulators |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6875 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Turrini,Marco Buti,Paul van den Noord,et al. DP6875 Defying the 'Juncker Curse?: Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected?. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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