| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6878 |
| DP6878 Arbitrage in the Foreign Exchange Market: Turning on the Microscope | |
| LUCIO SARNO; Dagfinn Rime; Farooq Akram | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Demand growth Entry |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6878 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535705 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | LUCIO SARNO,Dagfinn Rime,Farooq Akram. DP6878 Arbitrage in the Foreign Exchange Market: Turning on the Microscope. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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