| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6879 |
| DP6879 Competition, Takeovers and Gender Discrimination | |
| Jonas Vlachos; Helena Svaleryd; Fredrik Heyman | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mobile phone networks' practice of charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls has been pinpointed as the source of two competition problems: underprovision of calls and permanent disadvantages for small networks. We consider these allegations and four different remedies: limiting on/off-net differentials or off-net margins, lower termination fees, and asymmetric termination fees. In all cases a trade-off has to be made between efficiency and networks' profits on the one hand, and consumer surplus on the other. Indeed, the total welfare effects of regulating on/off-net differentials are ambiguous and depend on demand characteristics. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Network competition On/off-net differentials Retail price controls Termination fees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6879 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535706 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonas Vlachos,Helena Svaleryd,Fredrik Heyman. DP6879 Competition, Takeovers and Gender Discrimination. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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