| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6849 |
| DP6849 Testing a Model of the UK by the Method of Indirect Inference | |
| Patrick Minford; David Meenagh; Konstantinos Theodoridis | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | European policy makers, notably in the euro area, seem to take for granted that the electorate will punish them for bold reform in product and labour markets. This may explain why progress in the euro area has been comparatively limited. This paper posits and, using a dataset for 21 OECD countries, shows that this fear of electoral backlashes is unfounded, provided that financial markets work well. The mechanisms involved are relatively straightforward: well functioning financial markets "bring forward" future yields of structural reform to the present, thus permitting to overcome possible short-run costs. As a result, the electorate tend to reward, not punish, reformist governments. This has important implications for the design of structural reform packages, with financial market reforms being an essential ingredient beside product and labour market reforms. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Economic and monetary union Electoral cycle Financial markets Structural reforms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6849 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Minford,David Meenagh,Konstantinos Theodoridis. DP6849 Testing a Model of the UK by the Method of Indirect Inference. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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