| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6889 |
| DP6889 Optimal Central Bank Transparency | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Lex Hoogduin; Carin van der Cruijsen | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multiple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the importance of the different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of the contests with 15-30 percent probability; and, when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85-95 percent probability. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the effect of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Minorities Referendum Storable votes Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6889 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535725 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Lex Hoogduin,Carin van der Cruijsen. DP6889 Optimal Central Bank Transparency. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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