| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6895 |
| DP6895 The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment | |
| Johan Lagerlof; Andrew Seltzer | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a general equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compensation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-profile managers' compensation is in the form of various options and option-like rewards. We therefore measure the extent to which a convex contract alone can induce the manager to adopt near-optimal investment and hiring decisions. To ask this question is essentially to ask if such contracts can effectively align the stochastic discount factor of the manager with that of the shareholder-workers. We detail exact circumstances under which this alignment is possible and when it is not. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Convex contracts Executive compensation Stock options Corporate governance Optimal contracting Business cycles |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6895 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535731 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Lagerlof,Andrew Seltzer. DP6895 The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Johan Lagerlof]的文章 |
| [Andrew Seltzer]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Johan Lagerlof]的文章 |
| [Andrew Seltzer]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Johan Lagerlof]的文章 |
| [Andrew Seltzer]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
