| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6908 |
| DP6908 Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability¤ | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Maurizio Zanardi; Paola Conconi | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. Inflation then is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a panel data set on the transparency of 100 central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while there are central banks that would benefit from further transparency increases, some might already have reached the limit. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central bank transparency Inflation persistence monetary policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6908 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535744 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Maurizio Zanardi,Paola Conconi. DP6908 Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability¤. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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