| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6911 |
| DP6911 Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance | |
| Oddvar Martin Kaarboe; Luigi Siciliani | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-07-15 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two political regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Democratic peace Elections Term limits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6911 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535747 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oddvar Martin Kaarboe,Luigi Siciliani. DP6911 Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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