| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6931 |
| DP6931 Fiscal Conservatism in a New Democracy: 'Sophisticated' versus 'Naïve' Voters | |
| José Tavares; Paulo Arvate; George Avelino | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme for the verifiable dimension depends critically on the extent to which quality 1 increases or decreases the provider's marginal disutility and the patients' marginal benefit from quality 2 (i.e. substitutability or complementarity). Our main result is that under some circumstances a high-powered incentive scheme can be optimal even when the two quality dimensions are substitutes. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | altruism Pay for performance Quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6931 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José Tavares,Paulo Arvate,George Avelino. DP6931 Fiscal Conservatism in a New Democracy: 'Sophisticated' versus 'Naïve' Voters. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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