| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6818 |
| DP6818 People I Know: Job Search and Social Networks | |
| Alfonso Rosolia; Federico Cingano | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovator?s intellectual property rights. Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from its ability to prevent the upstream research unit from forming financial coalitions at the ex interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, based either on trade secrets or on patents. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the temporal structure of licensing fees, and show that the innovator?s ex interim financial constraint is more likely to bind when the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the financial flexibility of the upstream unit vis-a-vis her choice over the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research unit?s payoff selectively in such contingencies. This serves to incentivise the research unit to expend more effort ex ante, to generate more promising interim innovations. We further show that such interim-inefficient control rights can nevertheless be renegotiation-proof. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Control rights Corporate venturing Patents Trade secrets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6818 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535775 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alfonso Rosolia,Federico Cingano. DP6818 People I Know: Job Search and Social Networks. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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