| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6949
|
| DP6949 The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases |
| jan boone; Wieland Müller
|
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-23
|
| 出版年 | 2008
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper we abandon the usual assumption that patents bring known benefits to the industry or that their benefits are known to all parties. When royalty payments are increasing in one?s patent portfolio, private information about the quality of patents leads to a variety of distortions, in particular the incentives of firms to 'pad' by contributing weak patents. Three main results that emerge from the analysis are that: (i) the threat of court disputes reduces incentives to pad but at the cost of lower production of strong patents; (ii) mitigating this undesirable side-effect calls for a simultaneous increase in the cost of padding, that is, a better filtering of patent applications; (iii) upstream firms have more incentives to pad than vertically-integrated firms which internalize the fact that patent proliferation raises the share of profits going to the upstream segment of the industry but at the expense of its downstream segment. This seems consistent with recent evidence concerning padding. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Padding
Royalty
Standard setting organization
Weak patent
Frand
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6949
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535786
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
jan boone,Wieland Müller. DP6949 The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases. 2008.
|
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