G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6977
DP6977 Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms
Marco Pagano; Fausto Panunzi; Andrew Ellul
发表日期2008-09-23
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance laws affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Family firms Inheritance law Investor protection
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6977
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535814
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marco Pagano,Fausto Panunzi,Andrew Ellul. DP6977 Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms. 2008.
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