| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6998 |
| DP6998 Can Deunionization Lead to International Outsourcing? | |
| Kjell Erik Lommerud; Frode Meland | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Lobbying Political institutions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6998 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535816 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kjell Erik Lommerud,Frode Meland. DP6998 Can Deunionization Lead to International Outsourcing?. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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