| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7009 |
| DP7009 Path Forecast Evaluation | |
| Massimiliano Marcellino; Oscar Jorda | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-17 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Complementary patents Ip rights Licensing Patent pool Standards Vertical integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7009 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535826 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimiliano Marcellino,Oscar Jorda. DP7009 Path Forecast Evaluation. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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