| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6994 |
| DP6994 Media versus Special Interests | |
| Luigi Zingales; Alexander Dyck | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For many self-employed poor in the developing world, entrepreneurship involves experimenting with new technologies and learning about oneself. This paper explores the (positive and normative) implications of learning for the practice of lending to the poor. The optimal lending contract rationalizes several common aspects of microlending schemes, such as "mandatory saving requirements", "progressive lending" and "group funds". Joint liability contracts are, however, not necessarily optimal. Among the poorest borrowers the model predicts excessively high retention rates, the contemporaneous holding of borrowing and savings at unfavorable interest rates as well as the failure to undertake profitable and easily available investment opportunities, such as accepting larger loans to scale-up business. Further testable predictions can be used to interpret and guide the design of controlled field experiments to evaluate microlending schemes. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit constraints Group lending Microlending schemes Savings Scaling-up Self-discovery |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6994 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535849 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Zingales,Alexander Dyck. DP6994 Media versus Special Interests. 2008. |
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