| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6995 |
| DP6995 Modelling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement | |
| Carlo Carraro; Alessandra Sgobbi; Valentina Bosetti; Massimo Tavoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. We exploit the observed pattern of contributions - the 'revealed preference' of developers - to infer the underlying incentives. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify developers into distinct groups and study how contributions from each developer type vary by license (contract) type and other project characteristics. The central empirical finding is that developers strongly sort by license type, project size and corporate sponsorship. This evidence confirms the importance of heterogeneous motivations, specifically a key role for motivated agents and reputation, but less for reciprocity. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incentives Innovation Intrinsic motivation Motivated agents Open source software Reciprocity Reputation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6995 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535850 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Carraro,Alessandra Sgobbi,Valentina Bosetti,et al. DP6995 Modelling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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