| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7020 |
| DP7020 Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting Parties Matter? Evidence from Syndicated Bank Loans | |
| YIshay Yafeh; Mariassunta Giannetti | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-24 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly negatively correlated between players. In marked contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the stakes exceed a certain threshold, and that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies. For low stakes, the equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and coincides with the planner's solution. For high stakes, the equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and tantamount to myopic behavior. For intermediate stakes, there is a continuum of equilibria. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bayesian learning Exponential distribution Markov perfect equilibrium Poisson process Strategic experimentation Two-armed bandit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7020 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535857 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | YIshay Yafeh,Mariassunta Giannetti. DP7020 Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting Parties Matter? Evidence from Syndicated Bank Loans. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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