| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7022 |
| DP7022 A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality | |
| Jonathan D. Ostry; Olivier Jeanne; Jeromin Zettelmeyer | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-24 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion regarding the timing of its release. While it is well known that firms appear to delay the release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the economy (or the industry) affects this decision. We develop a dynamic model of strategic disclosure in which a firm may privately receive information at a time that is random (and independent of the state of the economy). Because investors are uncertain regarding whether and when the firm has received information, the firm will not necessarily disclose the information immediately. We show that bad news about the economy can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good news about the economy can slow the release of information by firms. As a result, the release of negative information tends to be clustered. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preempt the arrival of external information by disclosing their own information first. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock and market returns. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Earnings announcement Disclosure Disclosure dynamics Disclosure timing stochastic volatility Skewness Strategic disclosure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7022 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535859 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan D. Ostry,Olivier Jeanne,Jeromin Zettelmeyer. DP7022 A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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