| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7025 |
| DP7025 Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibria Without Apology | |
| Xavier Vives; Alex Kovalenkov | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-24 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a complete contracting model, a risk-neutral seller exerts effort while producing a good. Effort is a hidden action and stochastically influences the risk-neutral buyer's valuation. Then the buyer can gather private information about his valuation. The ex ante optimal contract may encourage information gathering, even though it is commonly known that it is ex post efficient to trade regardless of the buyer's valuation (so that information gathering is a strategic, unproductive rent-seeking activity). Information gathering occurs even more often if it is a verifiable action. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Complete contracting Hold-up problem Information gathering |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7025 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535862 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives,Alex Kovalenkov. DP7025 Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibria Without Apology. 2008. |
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