| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7029 |
| DP7029 On the price elasticity of demand for patents | |
| Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie; Gaétan de Rassenfosse | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Descending auction Dutch auction First price sealed bid auction Information acquisition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7029 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535866 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,Gaétan de Rassenfosse. DP7029 On the price elasticity of demand for patents. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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