| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7042 |
| DP7042 Ethnic Parity in Labour Market Outcomes for Benefit Claimants | |
| Lorraine Dearden; Alice Mesnard; Claire Crawford; Jonathan Shaw; Barbara Sianesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to any policy before the election; they choose a non-linear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger. We first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where both parties choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent, subject to the constraint that they are reelected. We characterize a specific class of these BPR (Best Policy with Reelection) equilibria in which one of the parties plays its constituent's unconstrained optimal tax function. Equilibrium tax schedules are always piecewise linear. Depending on the income levels of the two parties' constituents, we obtain either classical left-vs-right equilibria (where poorer people vote for one party and richer people for the other one) or ends-against-the-middle equilibria (where both poor and rich people vote for one party while the middle class vote for the other party). In both types of equilibria both parties propose the same tax schedule to a subset of the population. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Ends-against-the-middle No commitment Piecewise linear income tax Postelection politics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7042 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535879 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lorraine Dearden,Alice Mesnard,Claire Crawford,et al. DP7042 Ethnic Parity in Labour Market Outcomes for Benefit Claimants. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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