全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7043 Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7043
	DP7043 Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
	Michael Kremer; Esther Duflo; Pascaline Dupas
发表日期	2008-11-17
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these permits is grandfathered, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. We show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets. If the share of grandfathered permits is sufficiently small, we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Climate change mitigation Global refunding scheme International agreements International permit markets Tradeable permits
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7043
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535880
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Michael Kremer,Esther Duflo,Pascaline Dupas. DP7043 Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya. 2008.