| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7077 |
| DP7077 Dynamic Merger Review | |
| Michael D. Whinston; Volker Nocke | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo. Efficient mechanisms may then exist, which also satisfy all agents' interim participation constraints. In this case, ex post inefficient voting mechanisms can be replaced by efficient ones without reducing any individual's expected utility. Intuitively, agents with a low willingness to pay have to contribute more under majority rule than under an efficient mechanism with a balanced budget. This possibility theorem is not universal in the sense of Schweizer (Games and Economic Behavior, 2005). |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Public goods Ex post efficiency Participation constraints Majority voting Possibility theorem |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7077 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535914 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Whinston,Volker Nocke. DP7077 Dynamic Merger Review. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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