全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7078 When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7078
	DP7078 When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability
	Andrew Hughes Hallett; Nicola Acocella; Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
发表日期	2008-12-08
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	This paper investigates long-term returns from unemployment compensation, exploiting variation from the UK JSA reform of 1996, which implied a major increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle. Search theory predicts that such changes should raise the proportion of non-claimant nonemployed, with consequences on search effort and labor market attachment, and lower the reservation wage of the unemployed, with negative effects on post-unemployment wages. I test these ideas on longitudinal data from Social Security records (LLMDB). Using a difference in differences approach, I find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after JSA introduction, as opposed to six months earlier, are 2.5-3% more likely to move from unemployment into Incapacity Benefits spells, and 4-5% less likely to have positive earnings in the following year. This latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial unemployment shock. Also, annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non treated. These results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits, they were not successful in moving them onto long-lasting or better jobs, with fairly long lasting unintended consequences on a number of labor market outcomes.
主题	Labour Economics
关键词	Job search Postunemployment earnings Unemployment compensation
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7078
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535915
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andrew Hughes Hallett,Nicola Acocella,Giovanni Di Bartolomeo. DP7078 When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability. 2008.