| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7083 |
| DP7083 Firm Default and Aggregate Fluctuations | |
| Jesper Linde; Tor Jacobson; Kasper Roszbach; Rikard Kindell | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Since enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per-capita income and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental regulation show that standards correlate positively with per-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistently with the model's predictions for benevolent governments |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Enforcement Legal standards Tollbooth view |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7083 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535919 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jesper Linde,Tor Jacobson,Kasper Roszbach,et al. DP7083 Firm Default and Aggregate Fluctuations. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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