| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7092 |
| DP7092 Naturalization and Employment of Immigrants in France (1968-1999) | |
| Denis Fougère; Mirna Safi | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze corporate fraud in a model in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation, because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb fraud, shareholders optimally choose auditing quality and the performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking external corporate governance and auditing regulation into account. For given managerial pay, it is optimal to rely on auditing when external governance is in an intermediate range. When both auditing and incentive pay are used, worse external governance must be balanced by heavier reliance on both of those incentive mechanisms. In designing managerial pay, equity can improve managerial incentives while stock options worsen them. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Accounting fraud Auditing Corporate governance Managerial compensation Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7092 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535929 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Denis Fougère,Mirna Safi. DP7092 Naturalization and Employment of Immigrants in France (1968-1999). 2008. |
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