| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7104 |
| DP7104 Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing | |
| Marco Pagano; Giovanni Immordino | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We introduce tax contracts and examine how they affect government formation and welfare of voters in a democracy with proportional elections. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new model of party competition in which parties choose tax rates, public-good provision, and perks, and we show that the introduction of tax contracts has two effects: a perks effect and a policy-shift effect. The former plays a central role in societies with a low degree of political polarization, where it tends to reduce politicians' perks. If a society is highly polarized, tax contracts can yield more moderate political outcomes. However, there are also circumstances in which tax contracts induce more extreme policies. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Government formation Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7104 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535941 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Pagano,Giovanni Immordino. DP7104 Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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