| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7109 |
| DP7109 Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a QualitySignal | |
| Winand Emons; Claude Fluet | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies the regulatory design in a industry where the regulated downstream provider of services to final consumers purchases the necessary inputs from an upstream supplier. The model is closely inspired by the UK regulatory mechanism for the railway network. Its philosophy is one of vertical separation between ownership and operation of the rolling stock: the Train Operating Company (TOC) leases from a ROlling Stock COmpany (ROSCO) the trains it uses in its franchise. This, we show, increases the flexibility and competitiveness of the network. On the other hand, it also reduces the specificity of the rolling stock, thus increasing the cost of running the service, and the TOC's incentive to exert quality enhancing effort, thus reducing the utility of the final users. Our simple model shows that the UK regime of separation may indeed be preferable from the point of view of welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Network regulation Railways Relation specific investment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7109 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535946 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons,Claude Fluet. DP7109 Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a QualitySignal. 2009. |
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