全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7114 Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7114
	DP7114 Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data
	Oriana Bandiera; Iwan Barankay; Imran Rasul
发表日期	2009
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.
主题	International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词	Debt Default Maturity structure No commitment
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7114
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535951
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Oriana Bandiera,Iwan Barankay,Imran Rasul. DP7114 Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data. 2009.