| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP7126
|
| DP7126 Economic Geography: a Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature |
| Stephen Redding
|
| 发表日期 | 2009-01-23
|
| 出版年 | 2009
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals differing in their willingness to pay for a taxed good vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade-off: more enforcement increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market.
We obtain that the equilibrium enforcement level is the one most-preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not affected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms' marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Imperfect competition
Intermediate preferences
Majority voting
Tax evasion
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7126
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535963
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Stephen Redding. DP7126 Economic Geography: a Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature. 2009.
|
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