| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7164 |
| DP7164 A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation | |
| Viral Acharya | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen world welfare when free trade is not reached and customs unions (CUs) form. We consider a model of many countries. Article XXIV prevents a CU from raising its common external tariff, which makes CU formation less attractive and explains why free trade is more likely. In an equilibrium where two CUs do form, one is necessarily larger than the other. We show that Article XXIV has a 'composition effect' on CU formation, whereby CUs are (endogenously) less asymmetric in size so more goods are subject to tariff distortions as they move between CUs; thus Article XXIV may be 'bad' for world welfare. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation game Customs union Protection Trade block Trade liberalization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7164 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535994 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral Acharya. DP7164 A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation. 2009. |
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