| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7168 |
| DP7168 Disclosure by Politicians | |
| Andrei Shleifer; Simeon Djankov; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Rafael La Porta | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We interview 20 executives in the UK who have been members of both PE and PLC boards of relatively large companies. The main difference we find in PE and PLC board modus operandi is in the single-minded value creation focus of PE boards versus governance compliance and risk management focus of PLC boards. PE boards see their role as "leading" the strategy of the firm through intense engagement with top management; in contrast, PLC boards ?accompany? the strategy of top management. PE boards report almost complete alignment in objectives between executive and non-executive directors, whereas the PLC boards report lack of complete alignment and focus on management of broader stakeholder interests. Finally, PE board members receive information that is primarily cash-focused and undergo an intensive induction during the due diligence phase. In contrast, PLC board members collect more diverse information and undergo a more structured (formal) rather than an intense induction. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7168 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535998 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrei Shleifer,Simeon Djankov,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,et al. DP7168 Disclosure by Politicians. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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