G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7193
DP7193 Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets
Roland Benabou
发表日期2009-03-01
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要We examine the interdependency between loan officer compensation contracts and commercial bank internal reporting systems (IRSs). The optimal incentive contract for bank loan officers may require the bank headquarters to commit not to act on certain types of information. The headquarters can achieve this by running a basic reporting system that restricts information flow within the bank. We show that origination fees for loan officers emerge naturally as part of the optimal contract in our set-up. We examine the likely effect of the new Basel Accord upon IRS choice, loan officer compensation, and bank investment strategies. We argue that the new Accord reduces the value of commitment, and hence that it may reduce the number of marginal projects financed by banks.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Compensation Internal reporting system Capital regulation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7193
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536030
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roland Benabou. DP7193 Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets. 2009.
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