| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7193 |
| DP7193 Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets | |
| Roland Benabou | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the interdependency between loan officer compensation contracts and commercial bank internal reporting systems (IRSs). The optimal incentive contract for bank loan officers may require the bank headquarters to commit not to act on certain types of information. The headquarters can achieve this by running a basic reporting system that restricts information flow within the bank. We show that origination fees for loan officers emerge naturally as part of the optimal contract in our set-up. We examine the likely effect of the new Basel Accord upon IRS choice, loan officer compensation, and bank investment strategies. We argue that the new Accord reduces the value of commitment, and hence that it may reduce the number of marginal projects financed by banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Compensation Internal reporting system Capital regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7193 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536030 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Benabou. DP7193 Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets. 2009. |
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