| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7200 |
| DP7200 Migration in an enlarged EU: A challenging solution? | |
| Klaus F. Zimmermann; Martin Kahanec | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default risk. If creditor rights are poorly protected, this contractual externality can generate novel equilibria with strategic default and rationing, in addition to equilibria with excessive lending or non-competitive rates. Information sharing among banks about clients' past indebtedness lowers interest and default rates, improves access to credit (unless the value of collateral is very uncertain) and may act as a substitute for creditor rights protection. If information sharing also allows banks to monitor their clients' subsequent indebtedness, the credit market may achieve full efficiency. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Creditor rights Information sharing Multiple-bank lending Non-exclusivity Seniority |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7200 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536037 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus F. Zimmermann,Martin Kahanec. DP7200 Migration in an enlarged EU: A challenging solution?. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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