| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP7211
|
| DP7211 A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
| Andrew Newman
|
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-08
|
| 出版年 | 2009
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Career concerns
Innovation
Institutional ownership
Productivity
R&d
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7211
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536046
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Andrew Newman. DP7211 A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 2009.
|
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