| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7216 |
| DP7216 Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility | |
| Kai Konrad; Salmai Qari; Benny Geys | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-15 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, the question has to be answered empirically. As a first step in that direction, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 490 participants. We consider "cooperative" investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding can be explained by Hart and Moore?s (2008) notion that contracts may serve as reference points. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Experiment Hold-up problem Option contracts Renegotiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7216 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536051 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kai Konrad,Salmai Qari,Benny Geys. DP7216 Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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