| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7221 |
| DP7221 Reference Points and Effort Provision | |
| Armin Falk; Lorenz Götte; David Huffman; Johannes Abeler | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-15 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for governance provided by external financiers and show that external governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance in improving efficiency. Interestingly, this leads us to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control. Finally, we explore how the internal organization of firms may be structured to enhance the role of internal governance. Our paper could explain why firms with limited external oversight, and firms in countries with poor external governance, can have substantial value. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Agency theory Corporate governance Dividends Internal organization Short-termism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7221 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536056 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Armin Falk,Lorenz Götte,David Huffman,et al. DP7221 Reference Points and Effort Provision. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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