| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7236 |
| DP7236 New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending multipliers | |
| John Taylor; Volker Wieland; Tobias Cwik; John F. Cogan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is shown that without values of losing, if players are heterogenous (they have different values) the best-of-three all-pay auction is less competitive (the difference between the players' probabilities to win is larger) as well as less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. If players are homogenous, however, the productivity and obviously the competitiveness of the best-of-three all-pay auction and the one-stage all-pay auction are identical. These results hold even if players have values of losing that do not depend on the stage in which the contest is decided. However, the best-of-three all-pay auction with different values of losing over the contest's stages may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions Contests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7236 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536071 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Taylor,Volker Wieland,Tobias Cwik,et al. DP7236 New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending multipliers. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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