| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7244 |
| DP7244 The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard | |
| Gordon M Myers; Anke Kessler; Christoph Luelfesmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We merge administrative information from a large German discount brokerage firm with regional data to examine if financial advisors improve portfolio performance. Our data track accounts of 32,751 randomly selected individual customers over 66 months and allow direct comparison of performance across self-managed accounts and accounts run by, or in consultation with, independent financial advisors. In contrast to the picture painted by simple descriptive statistics, econometric analysis that corrects for the endogeneity of the choice of having a financial advisor suggests that advisors are associated with lower total and excess account returns, higher portfolio risk and probabilities of losses, and higher trading frequency and portfolio turnover relative to what account owners of given characteristics tend to achieve on their own. Regression analysis of who uses a financial advisor suggests that advisors are matched with richer, older investors rather than with poorer, younger ones |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial advice Household finance Portfolio choice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7244 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536081 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gordon M Myers,Anke Kessler,Christoph Luelfesmann. DP7244 The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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