| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP7247
|
| DP7247 When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? |
| Daron Acemoğlu
|
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-05
|
| 出版年 | 2009
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The paper studies a federal system where a region provides non-contractible essential inputs for the successful implementation of a local public policy project with spill-overs, and where bargaining between different levels of government may ensure efficient decision making ex post. We ask whether the authority over the public policy measure should rest with the local government or with the central government, allowing financial relationships within the federation to be designed optimally. Centralization is shown to dominate when governments are benevolent. With regionally biased governments, both centralization and decentralization are suboptimal as long as political bargaining does not take place. With bargaining, however, the first best can often be achieved under decentralization, but not under centralization. At the root of this result is the alignment of decision making over essential inputs and project size under decentralized governance. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Constitutions
Decentralization
Federalism
Grants
Political bargaining
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7247
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536084
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Daron Acemoğlu. DP7247 When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation?. 2009.
|
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