| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7263 |
| DP7263 Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias | |
| Anne Sibert; Hamid Sabourian | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-12 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper establishes a causal effect of product market competition on various characteristics of organizational design. Using a unique panel dataset on firm hierarchies of large U.S. firms (1986-1999) and a quasi-natural experiment (trade liberalization), we find that increasing competition leads firms to flatten their hierarchies, i.e., (i) firms reduce the number of positions between the CEO and division managers and (ii) increase the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO (span of control). Firms also alter the structure and level of division manager compensation, increasing total pay as well as local (division-level) and global (firm-level) incentives. Our estimates show that for the average firm, span of control increased by 6% and depth decreased by 11% as a result of the quasi-natural experiment. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Competition Complementarities Decentralization Hierarchy Incentives Organizational change Organizational structure Performance-related pay |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7263 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536100 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anne Sibert,Hamid Sabourian. DP7263 Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias. 2009. |
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