G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7280
DP7280 Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
Marco Pagano; Michele Polo; Giovanni Immordino
发表日期2009-04-26
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and transitory shocks to output in a model of tax and public consumption smoothing. The model predicts that optimal reaction of public expenditures and deficits to transitory shocks should be countercyclical, while optimal reaction to permanent shocks should be a-cyclical. Using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology for identifying permanent and transitory shocks, we test these predictions for a sample of 22 OECD countries over the years 1963-2006. We find that both expenditures and deficits are countercyclical to transitory shocks, mainly through public transfers and mainly in recessions. We find that government investment is pro-cyclical with respect to permanent shocks, but total expenditures are not.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Business cycles Fiscal policy Permanent and transitory shocks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7280
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536117
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marco Pagano,Michele Polo,Giovanni Immordino. DP7280 Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?. 2009.
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