全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7280 Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7280
	DP7280 Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
	Marco Pagano; Michele Polo; Giovanni Immordino
发表日期	2009-04-26
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and transitory shocks to output in a model of tax and public consumption smoothing. The model predicts that optimal reaction of public expenditures and deficits to transitory shocks should be countercyclical, while optimal reaction to permanent shocks should be a-cyclical. Using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology for identifying permanent and transitory shocks, we test these predictions for a sample of 22 OECD countries over the years 1963-2006. We find that both expenditures and deficits are countercyclical to transitory shocks, mainly through public transfers and mainly in recessions. We find that government investment is pro-cyclical with respect to permanent shocks, but total expenditures are not.
主题	International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词	Business cycles Fiscal policy Permanent and transitory shocks
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7280
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536117
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Pagano,Michele Polo,Giovanni Immordino. DP7280 Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?. 2009.