| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7285 |
| DP7285 Budgeting versus implementing fiscal policy in the EU | |
| Roel Beetsma; Massimo Giuliodori; Peter Wierts | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also failed to honor them four times. We ask what allowed the sovereign to borrow much while defaulting often. Earlier work emphasized either banker irrationality or the importance of sanctions. Using new archival data, we show that neither interpretation is supported by the evidence. What sustained lending was the ability of bankers to cut off Philip II?s access to smoothing services. We analyze the incentive structure that supported the cohesion of this bankers' coalition. Lending moratoria were sustained through a "cheat the cheater" mechanism (Kletzer and Wright, 2000). |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Sovereign debt Serial default Early modern state finances Philip ii State capacity Incentive compatability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7285 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536122 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Massimo Giuliodori,Peter Wierts. DP7285 Budgeting versus implementing fiscal policy in the EU. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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