| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7296 |
| DP7296 Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries | |
| Emmanuelle Auriol; Sara Biancini | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this note we introduce a general class of games where the payoff of every player are affected by her intrinsic taste for available strategic choices; intensity of her dyadic social interactions of with others in the peer group; and conformity effect. We show, that if the dyadic social influences are symmetric and the conformity effect is identical for all players, every game in our class admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Our proof relies on the fact that our game is potential (Rosenthal (1973), Monderer and Shapley (1996)). We also illustrate the universality of our result through a large spectrum of applications in economics, political science and sociology. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Conformity effect Dyadic externalities Nash equilibria Potential games Social interactions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7296 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536133 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuelle Auriol,Sara Biancini. DP7296 Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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