G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7296
DP7296 Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries
Emmanuelle Auriol; Sara Biancini
发表日期2009-05-10
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要In this note we introduce a general class of games where the payoff of every player are affected by her intrinsic taste for available strategic choices; intensity of her dyadic social interactions of with others in the peer group; and conformity effect. We show, that if the dyadic social influences are symmetric and the conformity effect is identical for all players, every game in our class admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Our proof relies on the fact that our game is potential (Rosenthal (1973), Monderer and Shapley (1996)). We also illustrate the universality of our result through a large spectrum of applications in economics, political science and sociology.
主题Public Economics
关键词Conformity effect Dyadic externalities Nash equilibria Potential games Social interactions
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7296
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536133
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Emmanuelle Auriol,Sara Biancini. DP7296 Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries. 2009.
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