| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7297 |
| DP7297 MEDEA: A DSGE Model for the Spanish Economy | |
| Juan Francisco Rubio-Ramírez; Pablo Burriel; Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become increasingly stringent as the probability of social harm increases, switching first from laissez-faire to a penalty regime, then to a lenient authorization regime, and finally to a strict one. In contrast, absent innovative activity, regulation should rely only on authorizations, and laissez-faire is never optimal. Therefore, in innovative industries regulation should be softer. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Authorization Deterrence Innovation Liability for harm Safety regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7297 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536134 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Francisco Rubio-Ramírez,Pablo Burriel,Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde. DP7297 MEDEA: A DSGE Model for the Spanish Economy. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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