| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7309 |
| DP7309 On the Unstable Relationship between Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Fundamentals | |
| Philippe Bacchetta; Eric van Wincoop | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modelled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Crime policies Delinquency decision Key group Np-hard problem Social Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7309 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536145 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Bacchetta,Eric van Wincoop. DP7309 On the Unstable Relationship between Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Fundamentals. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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